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INTRODUCTION 
Over their long and incredibly prolific publishing careers, William Landes and 
Richard Posner (hereinafter L&P) have independently and jointly published what for 
mere mortals would be a large number of papers on intellectual property (hereinafter 
IP). Nevertheless, IP evidently is only a relatively minor interest to Posner. He has 
published merely 20 or so substantial papers on it, about half of which were written 
with Landes (pp 3-4), whereas his total output now runs to about 300 books and 
substantial papers, written at a rate of almost 10 a year since 1969, and during this 
time he has also written some 150 other pieces and served as an appeal court judge. In 
The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, L&P have now brought 
together and reworked many of their papers on IP (p 425) to give the most extensive 
commentary upon it from the ‘Posnerian’ law and economics perspective. With the 
striking exception of a sustained treatment of the unusual remedies extended to the 
protection of IP (p 7), most of the issues raised by IP are somewhere discussed in the 
papers now combined in this book, and a, to some extent new, framework for this 
discussion is given at the beginning of the book. The gist of L&P’s position is that, 
though they to some extent agree with the widely-held belief that copyright holders in 
particular (chs 2-3), but also patent holders to a lesser extent (pp 310-26), now enjoy 
excessive rights (p 9), they generally approve of intellectual property: ‘We do ?  find 
pretty solid economic support for a degree of trade secrecy protection close to what 
we have and for a degree of copyright and patent protection as well, but possibly a 
lesser degree than we have’ (p 9). 
 In this review we will argue that L&P’s defence of intellectual property is not 
reconcilable with the stance they have elsewhere taken towards government 
intervention. IP rights are government interventions in market allocations, and their 
justification is in terms of optimising the social welfare function. As such they should 
be subject to many of the criticisms L&P have levelled at other interventions, but they 
are not. Reflection on this paradox leads to interesting insights into the nature of 
Posnerian ‘efficiency’ and ‘welfare maximisation’. More broadly, it once again 
illustrates the way in which Posnerian law and economics is an interaction of 
mutually reinforcing economic and legal formalisms (Campbell and Picciotto 1998). 
A truly critical approach to both the law and the economics of IP could contribute to a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the social consequences of IP law, especially as it has 
developed in the recent past, and to some radical proposals for change. But L&P 
merely apply a hackneyed formula to yet another body of law, and so provide no more 
than a few ideas for tinkering with details of IP; despite being, as we will see, 
conscious that the entire edifice rests on the weakest of foundations. 
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L&P’S ARGUMENT FOR IP 
As the title of their book, and, of course, the nature of their entire work, leads one to 
expect, L&P’s account of IP law is economic. Quickly dismissing ‘Other perspectives 
…  besides the economic’ (p 4), L&P put forward ‘an analysis and evaluation of 
intellectual property law ?  conducted within an economic framework that seeks to 
align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency’ (p 4). As with their earlier 
work on eg tort law (p 10, cf Landes and Posner 1987), L&P’s aim is to cut through 
the complexities of the legal doctrines to enhance understanding of the ‘economic 
structure’ of IP, revealing the ‘deep commonality, as well as significant differences, 
among the various fields of intellectual property law, and between intellectual 
property law and the law governing physical property’ (p10). 
 But whereas L&P are confident that their work on tort does show a ‘generally 
efficient’ ‘unity’ to the law it studies, they concede from the start that IP does not 
have such a unity, and consequently there is a ‘degree to which economic analysis of 
intellectual property remains inconclusive, if not indeterminate’ (p10). Consequently, 
in order to bring such unity and structure to the field as is possible, they promise a 
novel departure from the standard economic argument for IP. That argument is, of 
course, that the state is required to grant IP ‘monopolies’ because, in their absence, 
the ‘intangible’ nature of IP makes it difficult to exclude non-paying use, and without 
the ability to charge for use, there will be insufficient incentive to innovate, so the rate 
of innovation will be too low. We will call this the ‘innovation argument’. L&P, 
however, tell us that: 
It may come as a surprise to many readers that the economic arguments 
we make for intellectual property protection are not based primarily on a 
belief that without legal protection the incentives to create such property 
would be inadequate. That belief cannot be defended confidently on the 
basis of current knowledge. The concerns we highlight have rather to do 
with such things as optimal management of existing stocks of intellectual 
property, congestion externalities, search costs, rent-seeking, and 
transaction costs (pp 9-10). 
 Throughout their book, L&P do indeed highlight subsidiary aspects of the case 
for IP. The patent, for example, is defended on the basis that, in its absence, ‘investors 
would invest many more resources in maintaining trade secrecy (and competitors in 
unmasking them) and inventive activity would be inefficiently biased toward 
inventions that can kept secret’ (p 328). ‘Moral rights’ (in their US form at least) are 
criticised because ‘much of what they seek to prevent is already forbidden, often by 
criminal as well as civil law’ (p 276), and the mischiefs they alone seek to address are 
‘too rare to justify the creation and maintenance of a complex body of law (with 
undesirable side-effects) designed to prevent them arising’ (p 280). One could go on 
for this book does make provocative comments about many of the current lively 
policy issues within IP law. In particular, its remarks on ‘congestion effects’ (pp 222-
8) are, we believe, an unarguably interesting contribution. 
 But when it comes to the basic issue raised by IP law, which is whether it is 
justified at all, L&P are committed to the innovation argument. This is the core of 
‘The Economic Theory of Property’ set out in Chapter 1, and recapitulated at points 
throughout the book. Their basic account is so conventional that it does not seem 
worthwhile to set it out in full, and, in truth, there does not seem to be much substance 
to their claim to be stating a novel economic argument for IP. Instead, they place 
equivocation about the innovation theory at the heart of their account of that theory. 
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L&P repeatedly tell us that IP rights have ‘social costs’ (p 172), that the argument for 
the necessity of IP rights for innovation to take place is ‘easily exaggerated’ (p 53), 
that it would be a mistake to take the growth in the use of IP rights to be ‘a reliable 
proxy for technological advance’ (p 352), etc; and, in sum, they emphasise a ‘cost-
benefit tradeoff’ (p 21) ‘between “incentive” and “access”’ (p 11) in their statement of 
the innovation theory. 
 But, although the preposterous partiality of much pleading in IP cases, and of 
most public debate when yet greater rights are sought, would hardly lead one to 
realise it, the interesting literature on IP is already dominated by the realisation that 
the curtailing of IP rights by fair use exceptions, limitations of time and extent, de 
facto permission for wholesale violation, etc is essential to maintain any plausibility 
in the argument that granting those rights enhances welfare. L&P are merely placing 
these limitations at the heart of their account of the innovation argument. By focusing 
on partial aspects of the innovation argument and by registering all sorts of caveats 
about it, it appears that L&P are taking a distance from that argument, but, with 
respect, they are merely stating the argument in a less than scrupulous manner. They 
do not defend that argument outright, but they do basically maintain it, and actually 
shield it from criticism by treating the counter-evidence as caveats which leave the 
basic argument intact. 
 All this is an instance of the ‘exception barring’ which Lakatos (1978, ch 1) has 
told us is used to excess in the defence of degenerate research programmes. L&P 
plausibly argue that the passage of the US Copyright Act in 1976 marks a step change 
in the long history of IP, and we are now in period of unprecedented, tremendous 
growth in IP rights (pp 2-3, 403-4, 406-7). Of this they say: ‘Whether the increases in 
the legal protection of intellectual property since 1976 have conferred net benefits on 
the US economy is uncertain’ (p 416). Now, whilst arguments of this exception 
barring sort are hardly unknown in Posner’s previous work (Campbell and Picciotto, 
1998, pp 255-6), this is strikingly theoretically unscrupulous. For anyone who 
believes that government intervention should be eschewed unless it can reliably be 
shown to have net social benefits, being uncertain about the net benefits of IP should 
lead to nothing less than a call for its repeal, but L&P treat it as merely a qualification 
of their basically approving stance. They conclude that ‘definitive recommendations 
for fundamental change [to the existing law of IP] cannot be supported on the basis of 
existing knowledge’ (p 10), which is a marked, and markedly curious, reversal of 
Posner’s normal stance towards bodies of the law which cannot be shown to be 
efficient. 
 Another consideration makes it even more difficult to see why L&P would 
display this commitment to the innovation argument. Very commonly the IP rights 
they are defending when they accept the innovation argument are regarded as 
monopolies, and as such, one would have thought, anathema to the ‘pro-market’ 
stance of Posnerian law and economics. It is to the resolution of this paradox that this 
review now turns. 
  
IP AND ANTITRUST 
It can hardly be denied that ‘Many important antitrust cases have involved intellectual 
property’ (p 372), and indeed there now is a very considerable body of law in which 
‘the rights of owners of intellectual property have been shaped (mostly limited) to a 
great degree by antitrust law’ (p 372). Important parts of this body of law are 
reviewed in Chapter 14, in the course of which L&P’s view of the relationship of IP 
and antitrust emerges. This attitude is very sympathetic indeed to the IP side of this 
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relationship. It will not do to attack IP protection simply by exploiting the ‘persuasive 
definition’ (Stevenson 1938) of IP rights as monopolies, trusting to the pejorative 
connotation of ‘monopoly’ to prejudice the evaluation of those rights. (One might, 
however, feel that those proselytisers of IP who so commonly use ‘piracy’ and similar 
terms intending to benefit from the opposite connotation can hardly complain about 
this). However, when L&P argue that it is ‘a mistake’ ‘to suppose that there is an 
inherent tension between intellectual property law, because it confers “monopolies”, 
and antitrust law’ (p 374), they are purporting to make rather more than this good 
point. 
 L&P sometimes even seem to go so far as to say that IP rights can never 
productively be described as monopolies at all: ‘Talk of patent and copyright 
“monopolies” is conventional ?  This usage is harmless as long as it is understood to 
be different from how the same word is used in antitrust analysis’ (p 374). The IP 
right merely creates private property in intangible goods just as, say, land law creates 
it in tangible goods: 
One does not say that the owner has a parcel of land has a monopoly 
because he has the right to exclude others from using this land. But a 
patent or a copyright is a monopoly in the same sense. It excludes other 
people from using some piece of intellectual property without consent. 
That in itself has no antitrust significance (p 374). 
 This is right in itself, but it is very partial, for one would have thought that, 
though they both create private property, it could not be denied that IP rights are 
created in a very different way to rights in land. But this is just what L&P do deny.2 In 
what in our opinion remains the most penetrating exposition and evaluation of the 
innovation argument, Plant (1974, pt 2; see further Picciotto and Campbell 2003, pp 
284-91) argued as long ago as 1934-5 that, as L&P have it, ‘intellectual property 
rights create scarcity whereas property rights in physical goods manage scarcity’ (p 
20). Although they initially seem to accept this point made by ‘the invaluable Plant’ 
(p 8), they ultimately reject it, claiming that:  
[Plant’s] point is incomplete. Unless there is a power to exclude, the 
incentive to create intellectual property in the first place may be impaired. 
Socially desirable investments ?  may be deterred if the creators of 
intellectual property cannot recoup their sunk costs ?  charging a price for 
an [IP right] reduces access to it (a social cost), making it artificially 
scarce (Plant’s point), but increases the incentive to create it in the first 
place, which is a possibly offsetting social benefit ?  Arnold Plant was 
mistaken to think that rights in physical property alleviate scarcity and 
rights in intellectual property create it ?  Information is a scarce good, 
just like land. Both are commodified – that is, made excludable property – 
in order to create incentives to alleviate their scarcity (pp 20-1, 374). 
 To the extent that L&P’s argument may be taken to yield any overall sense, it is 
that, as the creation of scarcity by means of IPs is necessary to give incentives to 
innovate, Plant is wrong to say this is the creation of scarcity! The necessity L&P feel 
to accept the innovation argument leads them to deny the objectionable aspects of that 
argument which Plant had the intellectual honesty to look in the face.3 L&P’s brief 
rejection of this important position in the analysis of IP is too slight to be taken 
seriously, but it is expressive of the extent of their sympathy to IP and, we will argue, 
the unsatisfactory way they maintain it.  
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 L&P’s other line, not readily reconcilable with the denial that IP rights can 
usefully be regarded as monopolies at all, is that, though they do tend to create 
monopolies, this is not really a very serious problem: ‘we do not mean to suggest that 
every copyright and every patent should raise warning flags for antitrust enforcers. 
Most copyrights and patents do not confer enough market power to raise any kind of 
antitrust issue’ (p 15 n 11). The most sustained exposition of the concept of market 
power in the book concludes that we normally should have ‘no worry’ (p 378) about 
IP in this respect ‘because the vast majority of copyrights, patents, and other 
intellectual property rights confer no more monopoly power on the owner of the right 
than owning the only barber shop within a five-block radius’ (pp 378-9). Even had we 
the space to do so, we would not wish to go through what L&P say of these monopoly 
problems at any length, for the labour would not be repaid. We want only to convey 
the nature of their attitude to these problems by quoting their treatment of them as 
they are posed by the ‘new economy’ (p 390) based on information technology: 
The features of the new economy …  tug it toward monopoly yet, oddly, 
also toward competition. The more protection from competition a firm 
that succeeds in obtaining a monopoly will enjoy, the more competition 
there will be to become that monopolist; and provided that the only 
feasible or permitted means of obtaining the monopoly are socially 
productive, this competition may be wholly desirable rather than a form of 
wasteful rent-seeking. A firm that will have the protection both of 
intellectual property law and of economies of scale in consumption if it is 
the first to come up with an essential component of a new economy 
product or service will have a lucrative monopoly, and this product should 
accelerate the rate of innovation, just as, other things being equal, the 
more valuable a hoard of buried treasure is, the more rapidly it will be 
recovered (p 395).  
 Well, that’s alright then. Similarly, ‘provided that’ Campbell’s dog has feathers 
instead of fur, then, ‘other things being equal’ (he also has a beak instead of a muzzle, 
two instead of four feet, etc), then he is a duck. But, leaving aside the homespun 
complaisance and absurdity of this passage (and its flat contradiction of the many 
times L&P criticise IP as an inducement to rent-seeking, eg p 220), what is so wrong 
with this way of treating IP rights is that it obscures their essential nature as a public 
intervention. There certainly are varying degrees of market power, so that if one 
defines a monopoly by effective market power beyond a certain threshold, there will 
be interminable argument about whether IP in general or particular IP rights create a 
monopoly. But the whole point of IP is to strengthen market power by government 
intervention. When the intervention unarguably purports to create sole rights of 
supply with the purpose of enhancing market share, gives effect to these rights by 
state imposition of criminal sanctions foreign to competitive business, or by state 
enforcement of unusually draconian civil sanctions, and when there may well also be 
extensive government subsidy of the industries which the intervention is intended to 
benefit,4 it seems to us that it is but natural to call that intervention a monopoly; but 
we do not want to die in a ditch over this. The most important thing is to recognise 
that IP is an intervention, and to explore the consequences of this. 
 
IP AS AN INTERVENTION 
An intervention can have only one justification: that the social welfare function is 
improved by it, and this is, overall, what L&P believe to be the case with IP. They 
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hold that IP encourages ‘socially desirable investments’, which they define as 
‘investments that yield social benefits in excess of their social costs’ (p 20). They 
produce formal models of the welfare calculations necessary to show this for 
copyright (ch 3), trademarks (pp 174-9), patents (pp 297-300), and trade secrets (p 
366), and apply this formal reasoning to subsidiary problems such as the optimal 
duration (ch 8) and extent (ch 5) of copyright. 
 The crucial equation in all this modelling is the rather simple one that W = w – 
e(z), where W is net welfare, w is the total welfare provided by granting the IP right, 
and ‘e(z) is the cost of creating the particular work and is a function of the scope of 
the [IP] protection’ (p 80). (e is the ‘cost of expression’ and z ‘the level of [IP] 
protection’ (p 71)). As with all cost-benefit calculations, estimating cost in this case is 
likely to be insuperably difficult but in principle possible. On the other hand, benefit 
cannot be estimated even in principle if that benefit is, as it is typically claimed to be, 
the sum of the satisfactions enjoyed by citizens affected by the policy, for data is not 
available about citizens’ preferences regarding goods which, ex hypothesi, do not 
exist unless the decision is taken to intervene to produce them. (Cost-benefit analysis 
typically refuses to regard the fact that goods do not exist as expressive of a 
preference that they should not exist). Hence, benefit estimates are supplied by the 
modeller in the absence of preference data. In IP, the basic benefit is the accelerated 
rate of innovation which follows the grant of the IP right. 
 L&P follow the overwhelming majority of the IP literature by thinking that they 
can put realistic values into the algebra which allow them to determine, for example, 
whether copyright should be extended to unpublished works (pp 131-41). We get the 
following, entirely characteristic, priceless, result: 
An author of unpublished materials is likely to object to their being 
published because they reveal his disreputable or unethical behaviour. 
Knowing in advance that copyright protection for such materials was 
weak might induce him to behave better, thus raising social welfare ?  A 
risk remains that knowledge of discreditable jottings were not protected 
by copyright would induce people to be more discreet in those jottings. 
Since the private cost of discretion is likely to be less than its social cost 
in concealing valuable clues to character, the reticence factor will reduce 
the consumer surplus generated by biographies if unpublished materials 
are denied copyright protection (p 141). 
On this basis of this airy speculation, models for gauging the welfare consequences of 
various extensions of copyright are put forward in formal, algebraic terms which the 
speculation makes ridiculous (pp 131-41, 142-3). We imagine that many of those 
critical of Posner reading this review will not be surprised at this, for purporting to put 
objective numerical values on that what cannot be so valued is, of course, what 
Posnerian law and economics has long been about.5 
 When one puts cost-benefit estimates into practice as policy, one finds what 
appears so exact on the blackboard has to be turned into rather more rough and ready 
law, and, of course, the thrust of L&P’s book is that the existing law of IP is capable 
of being improved upon. Posner has always expressed a pronounced preference for 
litigation over legislation, but L&P are in fact broadly sympathetic to both the statute 
and the case law of IP. The most sustained criticism they make is of the US Visual 
Artists Rights Act 1990 and the miniscule litigation about moral rights which has 
followed it (ch 10), and even here the criticism of an unclear (p 286) statute which 
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does ‘not benefit the group [it] is intended to protect’ (p 287), and so has led to a 
‘paucity’ (p 286) of questionable (pp 273-4) judgments, is muted. 
 But statute and case-law of this quality have not always received gentle 
treatment at Posner’s hands. What strikes us about IP law, especially the court 
judgments, is just how inherently poor it is, with the contradictory necessity of 
curtailing the rights granted leading to the continual drawing of indefensible 
distinctions which themselves invite their own criticism. It is all highly reminiscent of 
what Posner has repeatedly said about the quality of antitrust law, the ‘vague 
provisions’ (Posner 1976, p 7) of which generally articulate ‘meaningless’ (Posner 
1976, p 59) doctrines which lead only to ‘confusion’ (Posner 1979, p 929). Why does 
the one intervention receive much gentler treatment at L&P’s hands than Posner has 
been known to mete out to the other? 
 
IP AND THE MARKET 
L&P are well aware that the innovation argument is essentially the argument for the 
creation of ‘public goods’: that the market would produce a sub-optimally low amount 
of these goods (pp 19-20), and that intervention is therefore required to produce a 
higher optimal amount, in the case of IP, a higher optimal rate of innovation. It is on 
this basis that, to take the famous example to which L&P themselves refer, that 
Hotelling (1938) argued for public financing of certain large construction works. But 
L&P are anxious to stress that ‘it is better to say that [a good produced under IP 
protection] has public-good characteristics than that it is a public good’ (p 225), for 
the crucial difference is, of course, that IP is a system of public goods delivered gratis 
into private hands: 
The very term “public good” is misleading ?  It sounds like a good 
produced by the government as opposed to the private sector. That is true 
of public goods that people cannot be excluded from having the benefit of 
even if they don’t contribute to the cost of supplying the goods. The 
clearest example is national defence. Many public goods, however, 
including intellectual property, are excludable in the sense that it is not 
possible to condition access to them on payment. Such goods need not be 
provided by the government (p 14).  
 Accepting, if only for the purposes of argument, L&P’s distinction between 
public goods, and the identification of IP as ‘an excludable public good’ (p 403 n 3), 
we want to concentrate on the important consequence of that distinction. Posner in 
particular has been known to be somewhat critical of the provision of public goods 
and the consequent necessity of regulation; indeed, the first paper he wrote, ‘Natural 
Monopoly and Its Regulation’ (Posner 1969), was an argument that ‘we would be 
better off without trying to regulate natural monopolies’ (Posner 1999, p vi). This 
paper has had an extraordinary impact, and arguably remains the best thing Posner has 
written. Public monopolies and public attempts to regulate private monopolies get a 
pretty thorough drubbing in this paper; but in his subsequent work on IP, the public 
placing of monopolies in private hands is looked upon, by contrast, very favourably, 
and the argument against regulation dropped. IP can, for example, readily be regarded 
as a way of regulating entry to a market, though the regulation seeks to narrow rather 
than expand entry. The anxiety Posner displayed in ‘Natural Monopoly and Its 
Regulation’ to argue that ‘Regulation of entry is unjustified and should be abandoned’ 
(Posner 1999, p 82) is precisely what is abandoned in his work on IP. It seems that the 
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monopoly which is deplored when the monopoly remains in public hands undergoes a 
dramatic transformation when the monopoly is granted to a private corporation. 
 L&P seem to believe that the only alternative to the growth in IP since 1976 was 
public ownership of these public goods, and of this they say: 
If in 1976 there had been no patent system but instead a system of direct 
government awards to successful inventors or direct government financing 
of R&D …  if royalties in licenses of intellectual property had been fixed 
by government rather than by contract; if the publication of books had 
been a government monopoly; if the prices of books, drugs, and other 
goods that embody intellectual property were fixed by a regulatory 
agency; if to minimise access costs intellectual property was given away 
for free and its costs subsidised by the government – if any of these things 
had been true, substitution of patent and copyright and trade secret and 
trademark law, in short of intellectual property rights, would have been a 
giant step in the right direction from the standpoint of economic efficiency 
and a major plank of the deregulation movement. But none of these things 
was true. Intellectual property was already “deregulated” in favour of a 
property-rights system (pp 414-5). 
Well, again, all one can say is that’s alright then. It is on the very next page that L&P 
tell us, as we have seen, that it ‘is uncertain’ whether IP since 1976 has ‘conferred net 
benefits’ (p 416), but it is obvious that, so long as the monopoly revenues accrue to 
private hands, monopolies will be tolerated.  
 The range of alternatives which L&P contemplate in the above paragraph is 
curiously limited. The provision of IP is, in their view, as in the view of the great 
majority of those writing on the subject, a matter of either a private or public 
monopoly. Posner and Landes are, indeed, in advance of much of the literature in 
giving extended consideration to the latter. But surely it is puzzling that they, of all 
writers, do not consider the alternative of market provision, for they do not think it 
possible that ‘such property would be created in a free-market system’ (p 376) (save 
for trivial exceptions). In an entirely characteristic passage they say: 
In the absence of intellectual property rights either the intellectual 
property will not be created or the government may have to finance it 
through a system of grants or rewards to writers and inventors. (We say 
“may”, not “will”, because there may be alternative sources of funding, 
such as private patronage.) (p 24). 
 There are two errors which inform this passage. The first is to ignore the 
possibilities of alternative, competitive business models as the basis of innovation, 
albeit ones which no doubt will lead to a typically lower rate of some kinds of 
innovation than is produced by the stimulus of the grant of the IP monopoly. The 
second is to assume that, when innovation does not take place absent the IP 
monopoly, this is always sub-optimal. But one does not have to be a Luddite to see 
that the rate of innovation cannot be assumed to be invariably positively correlated to 
welfare. One merely has to be other than fixated with growth of gdp to see this. What 
is more, the lower rate of innovation absent the IP intervention would be the rate 
produced by the market, even if this meant that the good produced under IP was not 
produced, and it is most curious to find L&P not giving any weight, indeed barely any 
recognition, to the market’s verdict that a good should not be produced because its 
production will not yield revenues in excess of the costs of its production.6 Normally, 
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when this is the case, (neo-)liberal economists conclude it is welfare optimising that 
the good is not produced, and question interventions which seek to produce it as a 
public good. But L&P clearly believe IP to be the acceptable face of intervention, and 
we can put this down only to the fact that IP monopolies are conferred upon private 
parties, not upon public undertakings.  
 The most substantial defence of market allocation of the goods which now are 
allocated through IP rights is that of Plant which we have mentioned above. L&P 
discuss Plant in their general consideration of the issues in their ‘Introduction’ and in 
Chapter 1, calling him ‘The leading sceptic’ about IP rights (p 21 n 18), and citing 
him as authority for raising the question whether ‘the high social costs of intellectual 
property rights create uncertainty as to whether on balance such rights are, from an 
overall social standpoint, cost-justified at all’ (p 21). They purport to take from Plant 
the argument that ‘intellectual property protection might result in too much 
intellectual property being produced rather than too little (or perhaps both, for 
different types of intellectual property)’ (p 22), and repeatedly cite him when they 
argue that present arrangements are inefficient in that they lead to one or other of 
these errors (e.g. p 374). But this is not what Plant means when he hazards the 
possibility that ‘there may be too much invention’ (Plant 1974, p 55). What Plant 
means is that there is no way of determining the optimal rate of innovation for an 
economy, and therefore we cannot have confidence in claims to be able to maximise 
the social welfare function by the intervention of creating or curtailing IP rights, 
regardless of whether the argument is that there is too little, just enough, or too much 
protection, for the necessary quantities cannot be known. If one cannot know these 
things, it is unwise to throw the great weight of state intervention backed by 
compulsion behind a particular position which cannot be known to be right and 
certainly will have costs and lead to rent-seeking. It is better to leave things to 
decentralised, voluntary allocations through the market, which will be crowded out by 
IP monopolies (Merges 1994). 
 L&P seem incapable of understanding Plant’s argument, and they repeatedly 
note aspects of it which should cause them to pause for thought, but, having noted, 
move on. In a typical fashion, they also cite Hayek making very similar points (p 
415), but again do not stop to learn from Hayek by pursuing those points. Even more 
strikingly, in the context of discussing the foundations of the theory of public goods, 
they, seemingly approvingly, cite Coase’s (1946) criticism of the concept of marginal 
cost that has played such a role in justifying intervention, which is that one cannot 
know what marginal costs are for the purposes of marginal cost pricing (p 23). 
Nevertheless, their entire book is an attempt to set an optimal level for the marginal 
revenues of the holders of various IP rights. L&P are even prepared to acknowledge 
that ‘the empirical studies required’ for proper identification of when it is necessary to 
grant IP rights to avoid the rate of innovation being ‘seriously suboptimal’ are not 
available and (if we read them aright) cannot be made available (p 24), but proceed 
regardless. In a throwaway line that one can hardly believe one is reading, they 
juxtapose the argument they take from Plant that the rate of innovation may be too 
high with an argument they take from Arrow (1985, ch 4) that (for reasons we need 
not set out) it may be too low, and of this they say: ‘Unfortunately, the weights of 
these two offsetting factors are unknown’ (p 304). In sum, L&P tell us that ‘Economic 
analysis has come up short of providing either theoretical or empirical grounds for 
assessing the overall effect of intellectual property law on economic welfare’ (p 422). 
We recall that L&P began their book by warning us that ‘economic analysis of 
intellectual property remains inconclusive, if not indeterminate’ (p 10). Now, whilst it 
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certainly is the case that they intentionally and, even more, unintentionally show this 
to be so, one does have to wonder what they therefore think the justification of their 
book can be. Their claim that what they show of IP law amounts to an ‘economic 
structure’ is an unintended parody of ‘structure’, or ‘IP’, or both. 
 In truth, behind the equivocations they repeatedly enter, L&P remain 
unthinkingly confident they that they can determine a social welfare function from 
which to judge the outcomes of IP intervention. It is important to stress that sort of 
intervention, rather than market allocation, is what Posnerian law and economics is all 
about (Campbell 1994, pp 445-9).7 Wealth maximisation is a sort of welfare 
economics, but a sort which has ‘economic’ ‘efficiency’, rather than any of the more 
left-wing sounding goals normally identified with welfare economics, as its end. It has 
proven impossible to say what wealth maximisation is in any theoretically coherent 
way. There seems to be no point saying more than that it represents the growth of 
private accumulation. The goal of wealth maximisation is not a fully competitive 
market, in which costs as well as profits are internalised, but a state of private 
accumulation in which the law is efficient to the extent that it is used to maximise 
private accumulation, even if, as is certainly the case with regard to IP, this involves 
extensive intervention in the market (pp 36, 415). The profound resonance of Posner’s 
work lies in the fact that this is, of course, an empirically accurate description of the 
role of the state in advanced capitalism, and the weakness of that work is that this is 
defended not as the intervention it is, but as ‘the market’. 
 All this harks back to the tortured interpretation of Pareto optimality that 
brought Posner to such prominence a quarter of a century ago. What the book under 
review contributes to the wealth maximisation literature is new evidence of just how 
much of a reformulation ‘market’, ‘competition’, etc undergo in Posnerian law and 
economics: 
Casual talk about patent and copyright “monopolies” …  implicitly views 
competition as the state in which there are many firms competing to sell 
the same product rather than as the state in which society’s scarce 
resources are being exploited as efficiently as possible. From the latter 
standpoint, which is more directly related to economic welfare, excluding 
others from the use of property either physical or intellectual may be 
procompetitive even if the result is a reduction in the number of 
competitors or a divergence from perfect competition …  If making 
intellectual property excludable creates value, the efficient allocation of 
resources may be improved even if an economic and not merely a nominal 
legal monopoly is created (p 379).  
The Posnerian touch8 is not that non-competitive outcomes are regarded as welfare 
optimising without any defence of how one would know this, for this is characteristic 
of the IP literature. It is that these outcomes are called competitive, when this is 
exactly what they are not. This passing off of ‘intervention’ as ‘market’ is the very 
essence of the Posnerian defence of ‘economic efficiency’. 
 
ONE ALTERNATIVE TO IP: RIGHTS TO REMUNERATION 
The major defect in the ‘structure’ of IP which L&P have erected on such shaky 
foundations is that they fail to consider alternative approaches towards providing 
rewards for innovation, especially more market-based approaches. The need for this 
has been recognised by other law and economics scholars, notably Kitch, who 
identifies both the ‘failure to consider the importance of licensing’ and the ‘failure to 
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consider the full range of policy variables’ as two of four ‘elementary and persistent 
errors in the economic analysis of IP’ (Kitch 2000).9 We would also add the neglect of 
the remedies for infringement, which we have mentioned are not discussed in L&P’s 
book. L&P fail to directly or systematically address these issues, no doubt because to 
do so would both require them to abandon the assumption that innovation must be 
encouraged by property rights formed on the basis of the innovation argument, as well 
as taking them further into the thicket of the complexities of IP law and practice than 
they would find it comfortable to go. Proper discussion of the panoply of draconian IP 
remedies, which now, of course, has added the public shaming of children to the 
incarceration of adults, would be a particularly rough ride. 
 Much IP scholarship has pointed to the disadvantages of protecting innovation 
in the form of exclusive private property rights. In practice, the valorisation of IP 
rights results from the sales of products which very often embody a multiplicity of 
those rights, frequently with different owners: for example, a multi-media product 
such as a DVD, which will combine music, lyrics, visuals and software; and bio-
medical products, which often depend on a variety of building blocks (Eisenberg 
2001). Granting each IP owner an exclusive right may create significant obstacles in 
the form of transaction costs for bargaining over these rights. It also produces some of 
the most deleterious effects of IP rights, such as defensive patenting to block off a 
competing technology. L&P discuss these problems (eg pp 310-26), but, 
characteristically, their discussion merely serves to relegate these problems to the 
sidelines and does not prevent them sticking to the innovation argument. 
 A very different economic analysis from L&P’s has been made by Shavell and 
van Ypersle (2001), who argue that a superior approach to the private property right 
would be a reward system, which they suggest could be based on sales data, and if 
done continuously would be based on superior information than that available to the 
innovator who normally has to estimate the value ex ante. L&P dismiss such 
suggestions, as well as those for compulsory licensing, as ‘hopelessly politicized’, 
without any further consideration (p 9). Yet careful analysis of the factors that should 
affect optimal design of rights over innovation points to their close connection with 
the ease of contracting over such rights (Gallini and Scotchmer 2002).  
 As we have suggested elsewhere (Picciotto and Campbell 2003), a strong case 
can be made for treating IP not as an exclusive property right, but a right to 
remuneration. This argument has been made in particular by Jerome Reichman, 
although he has limited it to incremental innovations which in his view do not merit 
the protection of full property rights (Reichman 2001). The creation of what would be 
in effect rights to use innovations, subject to acknowledgement and payment of 
appropriate fees, would, in our view, do much to redress the balance between 
appropriation and diffusion which many, including even L&P, consider has been 
weighted far too heavily in favour of exclusivity. Bargaining over the price and other 
terms of access would take place in a decentralised way in the shadow of this law, but 
since the legal remedy would be less stringent, the outcome would be less tightly 
prescribed (in favour of the IP rights holder).10 
 
CONCLUSION 
One is tempted to say that the shortcomings of L&P’s book are the result of the way it 
was composed: largely a stitching together of articles produced over almost twenty 
years. But, if the underlying argument is sufficiently sound, then, with adequate 
revision, there is no need for this way of writing to lead to such a disjointed or even 
incoherent end-product. Posner’s early, popular book on antitrust, for example, makes 
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a far better job of this (Posner 1976, pp vii-viii), and even his (and Easterbrook’s 
(1981)) casebook on antitrust reads more coherently than the book under review. One 
is obliged to note that the revision that has produced this book has not been adequate, 
for how else can one account for the repeated presence of flatly contradictory 
statements within paragraphs of each other? But the incoherence of the book is more, 
we believe, the result of the lack of soundness of its underlying argument. L&P wish 
to defend the innovation argument for IP, but no at all competent scholar can now do 
so without difficulty, for the necessity of curtailing the IP rights granted on the 
authority of the innovation argument is now what is most obvious to independent 
scholars (as opposed to IP lobbyists and practitioners). 
 The theoretically progressive thing to do in the light of this is acknowledge the 
shortcomings of the innovation argument and seek extensive improvement upon it. 
L&P instead enter an overwhelming number of exceptions, indeed congratulate 
themselves on having the acuity to do so, but maintain the basic argument intact. They 
do so despite the fact that IP, whether one calls it a system of monopolies or not, is a 
system of government intervention designed to alter what would otherwise be the 
results of market allocation, something about which one might have thought they 
would feel uncomfortable The small discomfort that they actually seem to experience 
surely is yet further evidence that Posnerian wealth maximisation has very little 
indeed to do with encouraging markets and everything to do with organising state 
subsidy of private accumulation. 
 But the, as it were, right-wing error of approving copyright legislation which the 
entertainment corporation is bound to capture, or patent regulation the agribusiness 
and pharmaceutical corporation is highly likely to capture, etc, has a complementary 
left-wing error. The entire western marxist tradition was a critique of the degradation 
of culture produced by the corporate sales effort,11 and in a strong sense this was 
right. But this is a critique of ‘the market’, and so western marxism had had little 
power to relate its critique to specific institutions, largely degenerating into a sort of 
intellectual crie de coeur against the vulgarity of the choices of masses in the grip of 
false consciousness. But the ‘culture industry’ against which western marxism railed 
is a system of monopolising interventions by the state at the behest of inter alia the 
organised lobbying of capitalist corporations, ie it is not a market at all but its 
opposite; and this really is rather beyond the comprehension of most left-wing 
critiques of corporate capitalism. 
 We are here presented with a characteristic feature of the economic policy, and 
therefore the politics, of corporate capitalism. The most apparently antithetic left and 
right-wing positions are united in their commitment to the belief that the state can 
directly produce optimum outcomes, and their struggle being not over means but 
ends, there is a surprising degree of consensus about means. The inevitable result is a 
growth in the size and power of the state. In the course of this, the anarchist and 
libertarian strains that are the highest aspirations of left and right-wing politics are put 
off to the indefinite future and the work of policy now is to get hold of the state and 
use it. 
 It is not ultimately to the credit of left-wing politics that the contradictions of IP 
are greater for the right. L&P have spent their intellectual lives decrying intervention, 
but evidently not when corporate capitalism can find valuable use for it in the pursuit 
of accumulation, for this is wealth maximisation. The desperate tension in Posner’s 
version of law and economics between the freedom central to the concept of choice 
and the oppression central to making sure those choices maximise wealth as he 
understands it is nowhere more clear than in L&P’s views of intellectual property, in 
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which even monopolies redolent of mercantilism are viewed positively so long as they 
maximise corporate revenue. L&P have given us the benefit of their views on more or 
less everything already. There is only one subject about which they could write and 
make more clear the bias that is the central feature of their work in general, and their 




1 A review of WM Landes and RA Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual 
Property Law, Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, 
pp vi, 442, ISBN 0-674-01204-6, hbk, US$39.95. Unattributed page references are to 
this book. An earlier version of this review was read to the Annual Conference of the 
Canadian Law and Economics Association, University of Toronto, Canada, 
September 2004. We should like to thank Ronan Deazley for his comments on this 
review. 
2 There are many passage in this book which outright contradict this, for, as L&P 
themselves say, ‘we have seen throughout this book’ that intellectual property rights 
and ‘physical property rights’ do not have ‘identical economic properties’ (p 414), 
that government has a ‘much deeper involvement in intellectual than in physical 
property’ (p 36), and, in sum, that it is ‘perilous to extrapolate’ from physical property 
to IP (p 36). It is fruitless to chase through all the statements of this sort, from which 
an unsympathetic critic would conclude that this book is just overall incoherent. 
3 We do not wish to imply that Plant is alone. In the recent scholarship, contrast L&P 
to eg Kaplow (1984, p 1817): ‘A practice is deemed to violate the antitrust law 
because it is anticompetitive. But the very purpose of the patent grant is to reward the 
patentee by limiting competition, in full recognition that monopolistic evils are the 
price society will have to pay’.  
4 A high proportion of R&D is publicly funded. According to the OECD (2004, p 70) 
data, 30% of R&D is financed by governments; while 7% (in the US closer to 10%) 
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of industry spending on R&D is directly paid for by government (ie this does not 
include tax and other incentives). In addition, a high proportion of goods based on IP 
are price-regulated, notably pharmaceutical drugs which are purchased by state or 
insurance-funded healthcare systems. 
5 It is only relatively recently that Posnerian law and economics has turned its 
attention to the defence of cost-benefit analysis that Posnerian law and economics 
requires (Posner 2000). Nothing of substance seems to us to have been added to the 
vast existing literature on cost-benefit analysis in welfare economics, public 
administration, policy analysis, etc. 
6 We feel obliged to give an example so that the non-specialist reader may follow our 
reasoning, but this is a merely illustrative example which we pick because it suits our 
argument well. The leading work on the relationship of IP and antitrust, to which L&P 
refer (p 372 n 1), is Hovenkamp et al (2004), which uses the following example to 
illustrate the innovation argument (Hovenkamp et al 2002, para 4.1.c): ‘Making (the 
James Cameron film) Titanic may have cost $150,000,000’, and though it ‘can 
presumably be duplicated onto a video cassette for a cost of $2 per copy’, it is 
essential that we convey ‘very high market power’ by means of copyright upon its 
owners so that they can charge $20 per copy, otherwise they will not be able to 
recover their fixed and marginal costs and make a profit. We must make it plain that 
we believe that Titanic is dreadful rubbish, and that the film industry in particular and 
culture in general would be better without this sort of stuff, but the point is that 
intervention should not be put on a basis where differences of opinion of this nature 
are at all to the point. Can we be so sure that the making of Titanic, and all it implies 
about film, celebrity, advertising, etc, so optimises the social welfare function that it 
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justifies IP intervention? Can we be sufficiently confident about this that we should 
trump the market’s verdict that investments of this nature in Hollywood blockbusters 
should not be made (unless at a private investor’s hazard when faced with competition 
over diffusion)? 
 When this paper was presented to the Canadian Law and Economics Society, a 
member of the audience seemed to accept the point but asked ‘what about Citizen 
Kane?’ Three things might be said: (1) in our opinion, exactly the same point applies 
regardless of the merit of the film; (2) a specific case for the production of Citizen 
Kane might be made which would need to establish its superiority to Titanic. This 
would be a specific case for public support (perhaps more like a patent), rather then 
the block support presently granted by copyright. (The incorrigibility of this argument 
and its authoritarian implications are why we prefer (1) to (2)); and (3) after Citizen 
Kane, Welles never again enjoyed a really productive relationship with Hollywood, 
which repeatedly denied him finance. Now, Welles was not blameless in this, but a 
system of finance based on copyright that privileges pursuit of very high volume sales 
by mass marketing of IP protected brands was more to blame. A system that denies 
adequate funds to Orson Welles but gives them in superabundance to James Cameron 
cannot easily be said to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem. 
 Since this was submitted for publication, we have learned of a fourth point that 
might be made. Weber (2004, p 6) tells us that the special effects that are the only 
other than contemptible part of Titanic were created using Linux, which is, of course, 
open source software! The great success of Linux so contradicts the innovation 
argument that it has been called ‘the impossible public good’ (Kollock 1999, p 230). 
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7 The description of Posner’s relationship to Coase in this paper is quite wrong, and 
was hopefully corrected in later work (Campbell 1996). 
8 So far as we are aware, the first to apply the Chicago School approach to IP in this 
way was not Posner but Bowman, whose 1973 Patent and Antitrust Law turned on his 
belief that both policies aimed ‘to maximise wealth by producing what consumers 
want at the lowest cost’ (p 1). 
9 Kitch (2000, pp 1734-5) used earlier work by L&P to illustrate another such error 
and they respond to him in the book under review (pp 375-7). 
10 Unfortunately, of course, this approach is substantially precluded by the far-
reaching impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Property Rights (hereinafter 
TRIPS) administered by the World Trade Organisation. Nevertheless, the extent and 
efficacy of IP remedies, as well as the regulation of licensing, are central policy 
questions to be negotiated under the aegis of the TRIPS agreement.  
11 The leading figure is, of course, Adorno, and a useful collection of his papers on the 
theme is Adorno (1991). 
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